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In this Essay, I raise a metatheoretical question concerning the 
relationship between what seem to be two distinct categories of 
projects that might be lumped together under the rubric of empirical 
study of judicial performance. One kind of empirical project aims 
broadly at developing a social-scientific theory of judging, or as one 
legal philosopher recently put it, identifying the “causes” of legal 
decisions.1 Another kind of project aims at identifying quantitative, 
measurable criteria to provide an objective basis for evaluating the 
quality of judicial performance or, to use a more loaded term, “judicial 
merit.”2 I attempt to explain the distinction between these two types of 
projects and consider whether the very possibility of success in the 
former undermines the point of the latter. Would a theory that could 
predict how any given judge would likely decide any given case obviate 
the usefulness of general criteria for measuring judicial quality? I 
suggest here that the answer is no, because the two projects address 
fundamentally different types of questions. 
 
Copyright © 2018 Patrick S. Shin. 
 † Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law 
School; J.D., Harvard Law School; Ph.D. (Philosophy), Harvard University. This Article 
originally appeared on the Legal Workshop as part of the Duke Law Journal’s 2010 “Symposium 
on Evaluating Judging, Judges, and Judicial Institutions.” 
 1. Leslie Green, Law and the Causes of Judicial Decisions (Univ. of Oxford, Oxford Legal 
Research Paper No. 14/2009, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1374608. 
 2. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice: 
An Empirical Ranking of Judge Performance, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 23 (2004).  
SHIN POST MACRO (DO NOT DELETE) 5/17/2018  6:41 PM 
202 DUKE LAW JOURNAL ONLINE [Vol. 67:201 
One kind of empirical study of judicial decisionmaking might be 
regarded as continuous with the broader goal of social science, which I 
take to be something like understanding human behavior in general. I 
see the ultimate aim of this sort of empirical inquiry as developing a 
theory that explains and predicts judicial decisionmaking in roughly the 
same way a psychological theory might seek to explain and predict 
other observed phenomena of human behavior, such as the tendency 
to obey authority. Just as a successful psychological theory of 
obedience might, among other things, identify the conditions that 
explain why and predict whether a given subject will obey an order 
given by an authority figure in a particular context (for example, 
personal characteristics of the subject, the subject’s relation to the 
authority figure, the nature of the order, and its expected 
consequences), one might likewise consider an empirical theory of 
judging in this vein successful if it allows particular conditions to be 
identified—for example, political ideology, characteristics of the 
litigants, particular features of a case’s history, or the provenance of 
relevant precedent—that explain and predict judicial outcomes.3 
Within this broadly defined empirical project of explaining and 
predicting judicial decisionmaking as human social behavior—one 
might call it the project of “naturalizing jurisprudence”4—there are 
multiple theoretical perspectives that might be relevant. A single type 
of observed judicial decisionmaking might be understood 
simultaneously through the frameworks of sociology, political science, 
social psychology, cognitive psychology, and perhaps even 
neuropsychology. Whether or how all these empirical perspectives 
might be integrated remains unclear. Presumably, a grand unified 
theory of judicial decisionmaking is no more and no less likely than a 
grand unified theory of human behavior in general. All of these 
scientific perspectives may be viewed as having one common, general 
aim: they seek to provide causal explanations of judicial decisions—
 
 3. The numerous political science studies that examine correlations between judicial 
behavior and political affiliation within the framework of the “attitudinal” model of judging are 
perhaps the most familiar examples of this sort of theorizing. See Jack Knight, Are Empiricists 
Asking the Right Questions About Judicial Decisionmaking?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1531, 1534–38 (2009). 
 4. See BRIAN LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL 
REALISM AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (2007). I realize my usage here may be 
somewhat broader than Professor Leiter’s intended meaning. For a very helpful explanation of 
Leiter’s notion of naturalized jurisprudence, see Robin Bradley Kar, On the Prospects of a 
Naturalized Jurisprudence, NOTRE DAME PHIL. REV., July 31, 2009, http://ndpr.nd.edu/review
.cfm?id=16805 (reviewing LEITER, supra). 
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theories that identify the causal predicates of observed decisions and 
do so with predictive power.5 
A second type of empirical study of judicial performance seems 
quite different in its basic aim from the project of naturalizing 
jurisprudence. The goal of this second type of study might broadly be 
described as identifying quantified measures of good judicial 
performance—for example, citation counts, dissent rates, and 
productivity—that can be used to assess and even rank the quality of 
sitting judges, judicial candidates, and courts. This type of undertaking 
can be seen as a way of compiling otherwise inaccessible information 
that would presumably be of significant value to public officials, the 
citizenry, and judges themselves in evaluating and monitoring judicial 
performance. Public ratings of judges and courts based on this 
information might have the added desirable effect of sussing out the 
opaque criteria that various political actors use to champion particular 
judges or candidates, insofar as those ratings would exert pressure on 
such actors to give public explanations supporting any low-rated 
candidates they seek to promote.6 
What is the relationship between these two empirical projects of 
naturalizing jurisprudence and of measuring judicial performance? 
One possibility is that the need for objective measures of judicial 
performance is a function of the current infancy of the science of 
identifying the causes of judicial decisions. That is, objective measures 
that serve as proxies for judicial quality are only necessary because of 
the lack robust theories that would predict how a particular sort of 
judge would likely decide a particular sort of case. If such a theory 
existed, there would be no point in trying to develop any general 
measure of judicial quality. 
 
 5. This “naturalizing” project of identifying the causes of judicial decisions seems entangled 
with certain substantive jurisprudential claims associated with legal realism. Some empirical 
studies, for example, seem to start with the assumption that in many or even most cases, the law 
admits more than one possible outcome and so cannot be the cause of the actual outcome of the 
case. These studies presuppose that some other set of factors exists and causes the outcome; an 
empirical question remains regarding what those factors might be. This Essay is not the place to 
take issue with this argument (which I have admittedly caricatured), but I see no reason why an 
empirical study of judging should have to accept this argument at the outset. It might turn out, to 
be sure, that the theories with the most explanatory and predictive power tend to deemphasize 
the law as a determinant of decisions, but then again, it might not. It seems patently question-
begging to assume from the outset that judicial decisions must be explained by extrinsic, nonlegal 
considerations.  
 6. See Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Judicial Evaluations and Information 
Forcing: Ranking State High Courts and Their Judges, 58 DUKE L.J. 1313 (2009).  
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An example may help draw out the intuitive appeal of this 
conjecture. Suppose one could prove that in any case possessing the set 
of features F, involving a party with characteristics P, a second party 
with characteristics D, and given additional specifiable conditions C, a 
judge with a set of characteristics J will always decide the case in a way 
that is favorable to the party with characteristics P, whereas a judge 
lacking J will always decide against that party. One might argue that 
this postulate, if true, would undermine the relevance of any generic 
notion of judicial quality—apart from whatever constitutes J 
characteristics—in the context of cases with features F. If one could 
predict how any particular judge would decide this type of case, there 
would be no need for further information about the judge’s qualities, 
at least in that limited context. And if analogous predictions could be 
made with respect to cases with features F1, F2, and so on, and judges 
with characteristics J1, J2, and so on, there would be no more reason 
to care about measuring judicial quality in the context of those cases. 
Thus, the more progress empiricists make in the project of reducing 
judicial decisionmaking to its natural causes, the less relevance any 
project of measuring judicial performance will have. 
One might argue, in other words, that judicial quality matters 
because better judges presumably will make better decisions. But if it 
were possible to predict judicial decisions in the manner postulated, 
then no one would have reason to care about generic measures of 
judicial performance. There would be no reason to fret over proxy 
measures of good judicial decisionmaking if social science could deliver 
a theory that directly predicts how a particular judge or candidate 
would decide particular kinds of cases. 
I believe that this argument should be rejected. This argument’s 
fallacy involves its reliance on the implicit assumption that empirical 
measures of judicial performance are, at their core, nothing more than 
an indirect attempt to accomplish one of the goals of the project of 
naturalizing jurisprudence—namely, developing a theory with the 
power to predict the outcome of judicial decisions on the basis of 
specifiable causal predicates. But the project of measuring judicial 
performance need not be assimilated to that of theorizing the causes of 
judicial decisions. Rather, the project is fundamentally normative and 
evaluative in character. The basic question is not about the causes of 
decisions, but about what makes a good judge, or what constitute the 
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basic virtues of a good judge.7 Whereas the naturalizing project seeks 
to provide causal explanations for judicial behavior in a manner 
continuous with social science, the empirical study of judicial 
performance seeks to make explicit and then reduce to numbers our 
value judgments about the relative merits of selected characteristics of 
judicial performance. The ultimate test of a causal theory is its 
explanatory and predictive power. The test of a measure of judicial 
performance is ultimately the normative plausibility of its embedded 
value judgments about the core virtues of a judge and how well it 
captures those judgments.8 The two projects have incommensurable 
aims. 
There are, however, some important caveats. I do not deny the 
potential relevance of the findings of naturalized jurisprudence to the 
project of measuring judicial performance. For example, some 
observers might think that any evaluation of judicial performance 
should incorporate criteria that capture something like political 
independence or capacity for “nonideological” decisionmaking.9 But 
what if there were empirical evidence that indisputably established 
that, as a matter of fact, political affiliation almost always predicts 
judicial outcomes in certain types of cases? I suspect that if that were 
the case, there would be reason to doubt whether criteria aimed at 
measuring political independence could possibly capture anything 
meaningful. Standards of judicial quality must be tempered by 
contemporary knowledge regarding the limits of human psychology. 
This is a consequence of the basic moral premise that “ought” at least 
in some sense implies “can.” To that extent, the study of the causes of 
judicial behavior is potentially relevant to the project of measuring 
judicial quality. My point is not to deny this possible point of 
congruence, but rather to emphasize that society’s concept of a good 
judge is not simply given by how most judges in fact tend to behave. 
Findings in the science of judicial behavior cannot themselves 
determine the normative standards by which judges should be 
 
 7. See Lawrence B. Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centered Theory of Judging, 34 
METAPHILOSOPHY 178 (2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=369940.  
 8. For example, a study of judicial performance that ranks judges by citation count must 
assume—insofar as it is to be regarded as a study of judicial quality—that the ability to produce 
opinions that are cited by others is something we reasonably want in a judge. Whether we take 
the study seriously will depend on whether this assumption can be defended. This defense would 
require some argument that the ability to produce oft-cited writings captures some trait that is 
important to our normative ideal of a good judge. 
 9. See, e.g., Choi et al., supra note 6, at 1323 (“Independence is a hallmark of judicial 
quality.”). 
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measured and evaluated. This is a consequence of another basic moral 
premise, namely, that “is” does not imply “ought.” 
The other caveat is that my remarks assume that it is possible to 
construct a model of a good judge that is at least to some degree 
independent of considered preferences relating to case outcomes. This 
assumption means, among other things, that a judgment about whether 
a particular individual would make a good judge is not simply reducible 
to a set of predictions about the outcomes of cases that would come 
before that individual. But what if one were to reject this assumption? 
What if the concept of a good judge that best reflected societal and 
legal norms did in fact turn out to be nothing more than a reflection of 
collective preferences about case outcomes?10 In that case, I do think 
that measures of judicial performance that captured the concept might 
be collapsible into predictions of judicial behavior. That is, if society’s 
notion of a good judge turns out to be nothing more than a set of 
predictions about the likelihood of a judge’s reaching particular 
outcomes in particular cases, then measures of judicial performance 
would be nothing more than proxy predictions about what judges 
would probably do in such cases. It might follow, then, that my claim—
that the project of measuring judicial performance is fundamentally 
distinct from the project of determining the causes of judicial 
decisions—depends on the defensibility of a particular kind of concept 
of a good judge, namely, one that is not tied to the desirability of 
specific outcomes in particular cases. 
I do not think that this conclusion does, in fact, follow. Even if this 
sort of cynicism about the concept of a good judge were warranted, I 
believe that the project of naturalizing jurisprudence would still remain 
fundamentally different from the project of quantifying judicial 
performance, because the latter is essentially a normative endeavor in 
a way that the former is not. Even if every theorized measure of judicial 
performance turned out to be nothing more than an elliptical predictor 
of a particular set of case outcomes, every theorist’s proposed measure 
of judicial performance would still be answerable to questions about its 
underlying normative conception of a good judge. Empirical theories 
about the causes of judicial decisions need not answer these questions. 
 
 10. I do not argue for the point here, but I do not believe the concept of a good judge is 
straightforwardly dependent on preferences regarding case outcomes. I believe, for instance, that 
two people can agree about the core virtues of judging even if they have different outcome 
preferences.  
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Pretend, for example, that one could show that measures of 
judicial performance that depend on citation counts tend to highly rank 
judges who are more likely to invalidate legislation in federal 
constitutional cases. If that were true, then commentors might observe 
that these performance measures are empirically reducible to 
predictors of how judges will decide those kinds of constitutional cases. 
This finding would not, however, undermine my central argument, 
which is that the project of empirically measuring judicial performance, 
in contrast to the project of identifying the causes of judicial decisions, 
is fundamentally normative. The discovery of a sufficiently tight 
predictive correlation between citation counts and a disposition to 
invalidate legislation might support a claim that any interest in the 
former as a measure of judicial quality is really nothing more than an 
indicator of a preference for the latter outcome. But the question that 
this discovery would not and could not answer is whether anyone 
should therefore stop using the citation count measure as a benchmark 
for judicial performance. Arriving at an answer would require 
normative discussion about principles of judicial evaluation—
principles that specify why certain considerations should count as 
legitimate reasons for or against appointing someone as a judge. Any 
given measure of performance may collapse into a prediction about 
substantive case outcomes. This possibility does not show, however, 
that the measurement project itself collapses into a predictive one. 
Whatever an empirical theory of judicial performance might in fact be 
measuring, it must always answer one normative question that a purely 
predictive one need not answer: should the measures in question form 
the basis for evaluating judges? For this reason, the project of 
measuring judicial performance is inescapably normative in a way that 
the goal of naturalizing jurisprudence is not. 
Studies of judicial performance that seek to determine judicial 
quality by quantitative measures (such as citation count) will ultimately 
stand or fall on the strength of the normative reasons that can be 
marshaled for valuing as judges the kind of individuals who do well on 
those measures. Empirical measures of judicial performance ultimately 
depend on normative claims about what it means for someone to be a 
good judge, and the strength of any proposed empirical measure is 
necessarily a direct function of the strength of the justification of those 
normative claims. Theories about the causes of judicial performance 
do not depend on these justifications. And no purely empirical project 
can supply those justifications. That is a task for normative, not 
empirical, inquiry. 
